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Ethereum upgrade delay: Glamsterdam's gas invariants

Ethereum developers paused the Glamsterdam hard fork after audits found gas repricing breaks eight contract assumptions. How the change works and who must check.

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Ethereum's next network upgrade, Glamsterdam, has been put on hold while it is still on test networks. According to the Ethereum Foundation, two proposals that reprice gas, EIP-8037 and EIP-8038, would break assumptions that some live smart contracts rely on. This article explains why a change to gas pricing can turn into a security problem, and who now has homework to do.

The change in one paragraph

Glamsterdam bundles several protocol changes. Two of them change the price list for computation. EIP-8037 and EIP-8038 adjust what certain operations cost and rework how the network charges for state, the permanent data every node must store. While Glamsterdam was being tested, the audit firm Chainsecurity found several projects that would become exploitable once the new prices go live. Those projects depend on fixed assumptions about gas, known as invariants, and the two proposals would make those assumptions untrue. The Ethereum Foundation says there are eight such invariants.

Under the hood: why a price change can break code

Every action on Ethereum costs gas, a unit that measures work. A transaction sets a gas limit, and each operation inside it, such as reading storage, writing storage or calling another contract, uses up part of that budget. Gas is normally thought of as a fee topic. But smart contracts can also read how much gas is left and decide what to do based on it. That turns the price list into part of the program's logic.

A smart contract is code that cannot easily be changed after deployment. So a contract written years ago still carries the gas assumptions that were true when it was written. If the protocol later makes an operation cheaper or more expensive, the code keeps running, but the reasoning behind it may no longer hold.

  • Before: a contract can assume that a given amount of gas is too little to do something harmful, or just enough to finish a step.
  • The repricing: EIP-8037 and EIP-8038 change the cost of certain operations and of using state.
  • After: an action that used to run out of gas may now fit inside the same budget, or a step that used to fit may now fail.
  • The risk: if a safety check silently depended on that budget, an attacker may be able to do something the original developer believed was impossible.

This is the core point for readers. A gas repricing is not only about what users pay. It changes the physics that some contracts were built around, which is why auditors treat it as a security event.

Who is affected

The main group is smart contract developers and the teams that run deployed protocols. They need to check whether their code leans on any of the eight invariants. Auditors are asked to do the same for the projects they review. The Ethereum Foundation has created a public repository that lists the invariants, with short explanations, examples and ready-made prompts that teams can use to test their own code.

The Foundation is clear about the limits of its own review. It has brought in the audit firms Chainsecurity and Dedaub and is running internal audits as well. Yet in its blog post it wrote that "we can not cover all projects on Ethereum, especially not their on and off-chain code". Off-chain code matters too: bots, relayers and backend services may also budget gas based on today's prices.

The sheet names developers, auditors and project teams as the ones asked to act. Ordinary users are exposed only indirectly: it depends on whether the apps they use turn out to rely on one of the broken assumptions. Teams that find they are affected are asked to contact the Foundation through a dedicated Glamsterdam email inbox. Chainsecurity has also published more detail in its own blog post and a checking tool, the Foundation said.

When is the Ethereum upgrade now?

There is no new date. Core developers on the AllCoreDevs calls, the regular meetings where client teams coordinate upgrades, decided to pause the hard fork process. They will not fork the Hoodi testnet until the problems are resolved. Hoodi is one of the public test networks used as a dress rehearsal before an upgrade reaches mainnet, so holding it back stalls the schedule for now.

A decision is expected on upcoming AllCoreDevs calls. Before then, developers want two answers: what could break after Glamsterdam, and whether changes to the specification could prevent the problems. That second option is worth noting. The fix may come from adjusting the proposals rather than asking every contract to change.

What keeps moving

The pause does not stop all work. According to the Ethereum Foundation, development of Hegota, the upgrade planned after Glamsterdam, continues in parallel and is not slowed by the delay. For readers following the roadmap, this means one upgrade is being reworked while the next is still being built. In this case, the change to the rules is held back while the people running code on top of it check whether it is safe.

Sources

AI wrote this summary from the primary documents and reports cited above. It went live automatically after checks that figures match those sources and nothing is copied; there was no human review. It explains a protocol or rule change and is not investment advice.

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